IRAQ: What The Media Doesn't Report
IRAQ: What The Media Doesn't Report
By AMIR TAHERI
January 15, 2007 -- JUST outside Um al-Qasar, a port in south east Iraq, a crowd had gathered around a British armored car with a crew of four. An argument seemed to be heating up through an interpreter.
The interpreter told the Brits that the crowd was angry and wanted U.K. forces out of Iraq. But then a Kuwaiti representative of Amnesty International, accompanied by a journalist friend, approached - and found the crowd to be concerned about something quite different.
The real dispute? The day before, a British armored vehicle had an accident with a local taxi; now the cab's owner, backed by a few friends, was asking the Brits to speed up compensating him. Did these Iraqis want the Brits to leave, as the interpreter pretended? No, they shouted, a thousand times no!
So why did the interpreter inject that idea into the dialogue? Shaken, he tried a number of evasions: Well, had the Brits not been in Iraq, there wouldn't have been an accident in the first place. And, in any case, he knows that most Iraqis don't want foreign troops . . .
Since 2003, Iraq has experienced countless similar scenes, with interpreters, guides and "fixers" projecting their views and prejudices into the dialogue between Iraqis and the outside world.
Immediately after liberation, interpreting and "fixing" for the Coalition and for hundreds of foreign media people became a cottage industry, employing thousands. Most of those were former Ba'athist officials, often from the Ministry of Information or media companies owned by Saddam Hussein and his relatives. Some tried to curry favor with the new masters; others decided to wage political guerrilla war against the "invaders" by misleading them. Both ended up offering a twisted view of post-liberation Iraq.
The industry geared itself to meeting demand. In 2004, for example, many journalists coming to Baghdad wanted to interview the "militants" who were attacking U.S. soldiers. The industry obliged by arranging interviews.
One popular interviewee was one "Abu Muhammad," who claimed to be a fisherman by day and "a killer of Americans" by night. One U.K. paper paid $2,000 (a tidy sum in the cash-starved Baghdad of those days) for an exclusive with Abu Muhammad, who later took up a full chapter in a book published in London. The scam ended when someone found out that Abu Muhammad was, in fact, a busboy at a local hotel who'd grown a beard and was "fishing" Western journalists, splitting the proceeds with his cousin, who acted as interpreter and guide.
From 2004 onward, the situation improved. A new generation of Iraqi journalists with no Ba'athist background started to help Western colleagues. And Americans and Brits began hiring interpreters from outside Iraq, notably from ethnic Arab communities back home.
The new interpreters had some handicaps: They did not understand many Iraqi expressions and nuances; and Iraqis recognized them as non-Iraqis and were suspicious. Still, they were an improvement, for few had hidden agendas.
Covering Iraq has never been easy. The country had been closed to global media since the 1950s. Few Western journalists had traveled there, and those few mostly did so under official supervision. The only American journalist one can think of who had systematically remained interested in and knowledgeable about Iraq, for 40 years, was The Washington Post's Jim Hoagland. Not knowing Iraq, having no contacts there and not speaking the local Arabic would be handicaps in the best of times. It was more so in the context of a controversial war.
From the start, the war was also waged in Western circles, with their pro- and anti-war camps. A newspaper that had opposed the war would not tolerate "positive reporting" from Baghdad. One young British reporter who didn't understand that was surprised to see himself shifted to Paris to become a European correspondent. He had made the mistake of reporting that Iraq looked almost like a success, given where it had come from.
With the bulk of the media having opposed Saddam's ouster, negative reporting from Iraq became the norm. (Afghanistan gets a better press; Western elites are at worst ambivalent about the Taliban's fall.)
Another problem is that Iraq has become the focus of anti-American passions. Millions want Iraq to fail so that the United States will be humiliated. And Iraqis watch satellite TV - including channels from Iran, Egypt and Qatar that make a point of presenting post-liberation Iraq as a tragic quagmire. When CNN and the BBC send a similar message, Iraqis can be persuaded that their country is lost.
Imagine a resident of, say, Mandali or Nasseriah, who is told day and night that Iraq is sinking in a sea of fire and blood. He looks around and sees no evidence of that - but one can't blame him if he thinks that what the media say must be true in other parts of Iraq.
The fact that more than 90 percent of the violence that dominates reporting from Iraq takes place in five neighborhoods in Baghdad, plus one of the 18 Iraqi provinces, is neither here nor there. The perception is that all of Iraq is lost.
The old rule in the news business still holds: "If it bleeds, it leads." Stories about suicide attacks and carnage are more attractive than boring stuff about the emergence of a pluralist political consciousness and the mushrooming of thousands of small businesses.
Even the violence can't be properly covered. Reporters have no access to those who cause it and can only guess at their motives.
For a Western journalist who speaks no Arabic and has no contacts in the country, there are two options: embed with a U.S. or British military unit, or rely on Iraqi aides. Being embedded means seeing things through a narrow, and necessarily biased, angle. Relying on hired Iraqis means becoming a secondhand dealer in information that one cannot verify.
By AMIR TAHERI
January 15, 2007 -- JUST outside Um al-Qasar, a port in south east Iraq, a crowd had gathered around a British armored car with a crew of four. An argument seemed to be heating up through an interpreter.
The interpreter told the Brits that the crowd was angry and wanted U.K. forces out of Iraq. But then a Kuwaiti representative of Amnesty International, accompanied by a journalist friend, approached - and found the crowd to be concerned about something quite different.
The real dispute? The day before, a British armored vehicle had an accident with a local taxi; now the cab's owner, backed by a few friends, was asking the Brits to speed up compensating him. Did these Iraqis want the Brits to leave, as the interpreter pretended? No, they shouted, a thousand times no!
So why did the interpreter inject that idea into the dialogue? Shaken, he tried a number of evasions: Well, had the Brits not been in Iraq, there wouldn't have been an accident in the first place. And, in any case, he knows that most Iraqis don't want foreign troops . . .
Since 2003, Iraq has experienced countless similar scenes, with interpreters, guides and "fixers" projecting their views and prejudices into the dialogue between Iraqis and the outside world.
Immediately after liberation, interpreting and "fixing" for the Coalition and for hundreds of foreign media people became a cottage industry, employing thousands. Most of those were former Ba'athist officials, often from the Ministry of Information or media companies owned by Saddam Hussein and his relatives. Some tried to curry favor with the new masters; others decided to wage political guerrilla war against the "invaders" by misleading them. Both ended up offering a twisted view of post-liberation Iraq.
The industry geared itself to meeting demand. In 2004, for example, many journalists coming to Baghdad wanted to interview the "militants" who were attacking U.S. soldiers. The industry obliged by arranging interviews.
One popular interviewee was one "Abu Muhammad," who claimed to be a fisherman by day and "a killer of Americans" by night. One U.K. paper paid $2,000 (a tidy sum in the cash-starved Baghdad of those days) for an exclusive with Abu Muhammad, who later took up a full chapter in a book published in London. The scam ended when someone found out that Abu Muhammad was, in fact, a busboy at a local hotel who'd grown a beard and was "fishing" Western journalists, splitting the proceeds with his cousin, who acted as interpreter and guide.
From 2004 onward, the situation improved. A new generation of Iraqi journalists with no Ba'athist background started to help Western colleagues. And Americans and Brits began hiring interpreters from outside Iraq, notably from ethnic Arab communities back home.
The new interpreters had some handicaps: They did not understand many Iraqi expressions and nuances; and Iraqis recognized them as non-Iraqis and were suspicious. Still, they were an improvement, for few had hidden agendas.
Covering Iraq has never been easy. The country had been closed to global media since the 1950s. Few Western journalists had traveled there, and those few mostly did so under official supervision. The only American journalist one can think of who had systematically remained interested in and knowledgeable about Iraq, for 40 years, was The Washington Post's Jim Hoagland. Not knowing Iraq, having no contacts there and not speaking the local Arabic would be handicaps in the best of times. It was more so in the context of a controversial war.
From the start, the war was also waged in Western circles, with their pro- and anti-war camps. A newspaper that had opposed the war would not tolerate "positive reporting" from Baghdad. One young British reporter who didn't understand that was surprised to see himself shifted to Paris to become a European correspondent. He had made the mistake of reporting that Iraq looked almost like a success, given where it had come from.
With the bulk of the media having opposed Saddam's ouster, negative reporting from Iraq became the norm. (Afghanistan gets a better press; Western elites are at worst ambivalent about the Taliban's fall.)
Another problem is that Iraq has become the focus of anti-American passions. Millions want Iraq to fail so that the United States will be humiliated. And Iraqis watch satellite TV - including channels from Iran, Egypt and Qatar that make a point of presenting post-liberation Iraq as a tragic quagmire. When CNN and the BBC send a similar message, Iraqis can be persuaded that their country is lost.
Imagine a resident of, say, Mandali or Nasseriah, who is told day and night that Iraq is sinking in a sea of fire and blood. He looks around and sees no evidence of that - but one can't blame him if he thinks that what the media say must be true in other parts of Iraq.
The fact that more than 90 percent of the violence that dominates reporting from Iraq takes place in five neighborhoods in Baghdad, plus one of the 18 Iraqi provinces, is neither here nor there. The perception is that all of Iraq is lost.
The old rule in the news business still holds: "If it bleeds, it leads." Stories about suicide attacks and carnage are more attractive than boring stuff about the emergence of a pluralist political consciousness and the mushrooming of thousands of small businesses.
Even the violence can't be properly covered. Reporters have no access to those who cause it and can only guess at their motives.
For a Western journalist who speaks no Arabic and has no contacts in the country, there are two options: embed with a U.S. or British military unit, or rely on Iraqi aides. Being embedded means seeing things through a narrow, and necessarily biased, angle. Relying on hired Iraqis means becoming a secondhand dealer in information that one cannot verify.
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quote:Being embedded means seeing things through a narrow, and necessarily biased, angle.The military wanted "embedded reporters," they got 'em, and now it's not what they want?
One of these days they'll get it right.0 -
Question on this quote.: " The military wanted "embedded reporters," they got 'em, and now it's not what they want?"
Did the Military want "embedded reporters" or were they forced to accept them by the media and polititians?0 -
It was the military's idea. 0 -
quote:The fact that more than 90 percent of the violence that dominates reporting from Iraq takes place in five neighborhoods in Baghdad, plus one of the 18 Iraqi provinces, is neither here nor there. The perception is that all of Iraq is lost. If the violence afflicts such a small portion of Iraq, then why are so many American troops needed? Why does it seem so impossible for the American military and the Iraqi government to pacify a mere five neighborhoods and one province? Are our leaders saying that the fate of Iraq rests upon five neighborhoods in Baghdad? 0 -
If they dont want us , lets get the h311 out!
my intrest rates,wages & economy ..and a few other 'things',could do with a big boost!!
[;)]0 -
quote:Originally posted by mond
If they dont want us , lets get the h311 out!
my intrest rates,wages & economy ..and a few other 'things',could do with a big boost!!
[;)]
where do you think your rates, wages and economy will be if we get out of Iraq to soon and allow it to become an unchecked hot bed of terrorist training camps and a hub for launching attacks on UK and US soil? How did your economy react when the trains and buses were hit? I know my rates hit the floor when 9-11 hit. I don't like the way things have gone in Iraq...but it is the things that I have been told about...not all the truth. The very situation that got us involved in Iraq, lack of all the information, is now driving the effort to get us out of Iraq. There is no greater crime than to act with out all the facts and we seem to be doing that over and over again!0 -
quote:Originally posted by ElMuertoMonkey
quote:The fact that more than 90 percent of the violence that dominates reporting from Iraq takes place in five neighborhoods in Baghdad, plus one of the 18 Iraqi provinces, is neither here nor there. The perception is that all of Iraq is lost. If the violence afflicts such a small portion of Iraq, then why are so many American troops needed? Why does it seem so impossible for the American military and the Iraqi government to pacify a mere five neighborhoods and one province? Are our leaders saying that the fate of Iraq rests upon five neighborhoods in Baghdad?
The reporter was the one that stated that number, not a "leader" and if it were true it would depend on how many people are in the area. I've heard that Al Sadr has 40,000 in his militia -- no telling how many others are there that are Al Queda.
I'd say that the areas the reporter described are pretty good bomb targets.0 -
TexasVet,
Bombs rarely hit their intended target... and when they don't, they just p!$$ off all the wrong people, namely, the ones we're supposedly there to help.
Now those areas described might make pretty good targets for the Marines and the various special forces we have at our disposal, however.[;)][:D]0 -
Quote: "It was the military's idea.". Please show me where and when the actual Military in Iraq requested "Imbedded reporters". One thing
fighting troops dont need is "imbedded reporters" to protect and get in their way of fighting . Sometime you should try fighting with a reporter looking over your back to see if you are doing the proper things. You have fought in a war, havent you?? If not, shut the hell up till you do. It may just change your attitude to our troops. No trooper needs someone looking and and screaming "foul" like at a basketball game. It aint a game, BOY. It is kill or be killed. And many prefer to kill and not be killed. I for one remember my first
speech when joining a Inf Div in France. "You are not here to be killed
but to kill, do it well and often".0 -
Hell yeah! 0 -
quote:Originally posted by ElMuertoMonkey
TexasVet,
Bombs rarely hit their intended target... and when they don't, they just p!$$ off all the wrong people, namely, the ones we're supposedly there to help.
Now those areas described might make pretty good targets for the Marines and the various special forces we have at our disposal, however.[;)][:D]
You're right, John -- but there ain't nuthin' like a couple MOABs to soften things up!0 -
joeaf,
quote:Please show me where and when the actual Military in Iraq requested "Imbedded reporters".
Here goes:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/embed.html
quote:2. POLICY.
2.A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) POLICY ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS IS THAT MEDIA WILL HAVE LONG-TERM, MINIMALLY RESTRICTIVE ACCESS TO U.S. AIR, GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES THROUGH EMBEDDING. MEDIA COVERAGE OF ANY FUTURE OPERATION WILL, TO A LARGE EXTENT, SHAPE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOW AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC; THE PUBLIC IN ALLIED COUNTRIES WHOSE OPINION CAN AFFECT THE DURABILITY OF OUR COALITION; AND PUBLICS IN COUNTRIES WHERE WE CONDUCT OPERATIONS, WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF US CAN AFFECT THE COST AND DURATION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT. OUR ULTIMATE STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN BRINGING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THIS REGION WILL COME IN OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. WE NEED TO TELL THE FACTUAL STORY - GOOD OR BAD - BEFORE OTHERS SEED THE MEDIA WITH DISINFORMATION AND DISTORTIONS, AS THEY MOST CERTAINLY WILL CONTINUE TO DO. OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD NEED TO TELL OUR STORY - ONLY COMMANDERS CAN ENSURE THE MEDIA GET TO THE STORY ALONGSIDE THE TROOPS. WE MUST ORGANIZE FOR AND FACILITATE ACCESS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO OUR FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE FORCES ENGAGED IN GROUND OPERATIONS, WITH THE GOAL OF DOING SO RIGHT FROM THE START. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE WILL EMBED MEDIA WITH OUR UNITS. THESE EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL LIVE, WORK AND TRAVEL AS PART OF THE UNITS WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED TO FACILITATE MAXIMUM, IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF U.S. FORCES IN COMBAT AND RELATED OPERATIONS. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS MUST WORK TOGETHER TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR MEDIA ACCESS WITH THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY.
Sounds like a request to me.0 -
While the war may have not been sanctioned by the U.N, a think a legal justification could be found in the cease-fire agreement after the Desert Storm.
I looked around for a copy of the agreement, but couldn't find anything.0
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